THE ARMY AND NAVY DURING THE SECOND HALF OF
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Alexander II’s era of the Great Reforms
marked an important watershed for both services. In a series of reforms between
1861 and 1874, War Minister Dmitry Alexeyevich Milyutin created the foundations
for a genuine cadre- and reserve-based ground force. He facilitated
introduction of a universal service obligation, and he rearmed, reequipped, and
redeployed the army to contend with the gradually emerging German and
Austro-Hungarian threat along the Empire’s western frontier. In 1863–1864 the
army once again suppressed a Polish rebellion, while in the 1860s and 1870s
small mobile forces figured in extensive military conquests in Central Asia.
War also flared with Turkey in 1877–1878, during which the army, despite a
ragged beginning, inconsistent field leadership, and inadequacies in logistics
and medical support, acquitted itself well, especially in a decisive campaign
in the European theater south of the Balkan ridge. Similar circumstances
governed in the Transcausus theater, where the army overcame initial setbacks
to seize Kars and carry the campaign into Asia Minor.
Following the war of 1877–1878, planning
and deployment priorities wedded the army more closely to the western military
frontier and especially to peacetime deployments in Russian Poland. With
considerable difficulty, Alexander III presided over a limited force
modernization that witnessed the adoption of smokeless powder weaponry and
changes in size and force structure that kept the army on nearly equal terms
with its two more significant potential adversaries, Imperial Germany and
Austria-Hungary. At the same time, the end of the century brought extensive new
military commitments to the Far East, both to protect expanding imperial
interests and to participate in suppression of the Boxer Rebellion (1900).
The same challenges of force modernization
and diverse responsibilities bedeviled the navy, perhaps more so than the army.
During the 1860s and 1870s, the navy made the difficult transition from sail to
steam, but thereafter had to deal with increasingly diverse geostrategic
requirements that mandated retention of naval forces in at least four theaters
(Baltic, Northern, Black Sea, and Pacific), none of which were mutually
supporting. Simultaneously, the Russian Admiralty grappled with is sues of role
and identity, pondering whether the navy’s primary mission in war lay either
with coastal defense and commerce raiding or with attainment of true “blue
water” supremacy in the tradition of Alfred Thayer Mahan and his Russian
navalist disciples. Rationale notwithstanding, by 1898 Russia possessed
Europe’s third largest navy (nineteen capital ships and more than fifty
cruisers), thanks primarily to the ship-building programs of Alexander III.
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